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Abstract Science and technology policy is often confronted with issues that are
both complex and controversial and which have to be decided upon in a delicate
constellation of policy-makers, experts, stakeholders, non-governmental organiza-
tions and the public. One attempt to deal with such a complex problem is via citizen
involvement. Participatory technology assessment (pTA) already goes back to
several decades, and countries have made various experiences. While in some
countries, governments established technology assessment organizations, which
also included pTA in their methodological portfolio, others primarily rely on experts
to make decisions on science and technology policy. In a third group of countries
non-state actors, such as social scientists, experimented with pTA. However, they
were often unable to link these experiments to policy-making. This paper deals with
the question of why this variation exists and compares the use of pTA in Swit-
zerland and Austria. Despite similarities between the two countries, both had quite
different experiences with pTA so far. Whereas several pTAs have been carried out
in Switzerland until today, Austrian pTAs have remained infrequent. The aim of this
paper is to explain this difference as a result of different ways of policy-making
which affect the use and chances of pTA.
Zusammenfassung Forschungs- und Technologiepolitik ist oft mit Themen
konfrontiert, die sowohl wissensintensiv als auch kontrovers sind und in einer
schwierigen Konstellation von Entscheidungstra¨gerInnen, ExpertInnen, Stakehold-
ern, Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen und der O¨ffentlichkeit entschieden werden
mu¨ssen. Ein Ansatz, mit solchen komplexen Problemen umzugehen, sind Verfahren
der Bevo¨lkerungsbeteiligung. Die Geschichte des Participatory Technology
Assessments (pTA) reicht bereits einige Jahrzehnte zuru¨ck und die Erfahrungen, die
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damit in verschiedenen La¨ndern gemacht wurden, sind durchaus unterschiedlich.
Wa¨hrend Regierungen in einigen La¨ndern Organisationen eingerichtet haben, deren
methodisches Portfolio der Technikfolgenabscha¨tzung auch pTA-Ansa¨tze mit ein-
schließt, vertrauen Entscheidungstra¨gerInnen in anderen Staaten bei Techni-
kfolgenabscha¨tzung vor allem auf ExpertInnen. In einer dritten Gruppe von La¨ndern
haben nicht-staatliche AkteurInnen, wie zum Beispiel SozialwissenschaftlerInnen,
auf eigene Initiative damit begonnen, mit pTA zu experimentieren, waren jedoch
ha¨ufig nicht in der Lage, diese Experimente effektiv an politische Entscheidungs-
prozesse zu koppeln. Dieser Beitrag bescha¨ftigt sich mit dem Problem, warum diese
la¨nderspezifischen Unterschiede in der Anwendung von pTA existieren und ver-
sucht diese Fragestellung mit unterschiedlichen Praktiken des Politikmachens zu
erkla¨ren. Der Artikel vergleicht dazu O¨sterreich und die Schweiz. Wa¨hrend in der
Schweiz eine Reihe von pTAs erfolgreich durchgefu¨hrt wurden, blieb in O¨sterreich
die Zahl an Bevo¨lkerungsbeteiligungsverfahren im Bereich von Forschung und
Technologie gering.
Re´sume´ La politique de recherche et technologique se voit souvent confronte´e a`
des proble`mes demandant beaucoup de connaissance et suscitant des pole´miques et
sur lesquels de´cideurs, experts, parties prenantes, organisations non-gouvernemen-
tales et le public doivent de´cider dans des constellations difficiles. Un moyen pour
surmonter ces difficulte´s, ce sont les proce´de´s de participation de la population dans
les de´cisions qui affectent leur vie. L’histoire de l’e´valuation participative des
conse´quences technologiques remonte a` quelques de´cennies de´ja`, et les expe´riences
acquises dans diffe´rents pays sont assez divergents. Tandis que dans certains pays,
les gouvernements ont e´tabli des organisations dont le portfolio me´thodique
d’e´valuation des conse´quences technologiques incluait aussi des approches
d’e´valuation participative, dans d’autres pays, les de´cideurs s’appuient en premier
lieu sur les connaissances des experts. Dans un troisie`me groupe de pays, des
acteurs non-e´tatiques tels que par exemple des spe´cialistes des sciences sociales, ont
fait leurs propres expe´riences dans l’e´valuation participative des conse´quences
technologiques. Mais souvent ces expe´riences n’ont pas e´te´ prises en compte dans
les processus de´cisionnels politiques. Pourquoi y a-t-il ces diffe´rences spe´cifiques
aux pays dans l’e´valuation participative des conse´quences technologiques? Le
pre´sent article tente d’expliquer ce proble`me par les diffe´rentes pratiques d’e´labo-
ration de politiques en comparant l’Autriche a` la Suisse. Tandis qu’en Suisse,
nombre d’e´valuations participatives des conse´quences technologiques ont e´te´ re´a-
lise´es avec succe`s, le nombre de proce´de´s de participation de la population en
Autriche est reste´ ne´gligeable.
1 Introduction
Science and technology policy is often confronted with issues that are both
knowledge intensive and controversial. Frequently cited examples include genet-
ically modified organisms (GMOs), nuclear energy and nanotechnologies. Such
complex issues have to be decided upon in a delicate constellation of policy-makers,
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experts, stakeholders, NGOs and the public; in other words, within relationships that
are often laden with controversy and conflict. One attempt to disentangle this Gordic
knot is via citizen involvement. Participatory technology assessment (pTA), that is,
a structured process to include the public in decision making, already goes back
several decades and countries have so far had varied experiences (Joss and Bellucci
2002). While in some countries governments established technology assessment
organizations, which also included pTA in their methodological portfolio, others
solely rely on experts to make decisions on science and technology policy. In a third
group of countries, non-state actors, such as social scientists, tried to remedy the
absence of pTA procedures in official policy-making and took initiative to
experiment with pTA methods. However, they were often unable to link these
experiments to policy-making.
This paper addresses the question, why this variation exists. Why were some
countries successful in introducing pTA into decision making on science and
technology policy, while similar attempts remained unsuccessful in others? In order
to address this question, the paper compares the experiences in Switzerland and
Austria. The two neighbouring countries are small, Western European democracies,
and—in the case of Switzerland, partly—share one language. Both have well-
established Technology Assessment (TA) institutions, which are linked to their
respective Academy of Sciences. It would therefore be fair to assume that they share
great similarities in the use of pTA. However, both countries had quite different
experiences. Whereas several pTAs have been carried out in Switzerland so far
(Pfersdorf 2008; Crettaz von Roten 2011), Austrian pTAs have remained infrequent
(Grabner et al. 2002; Bogner 2004; Nentwich et al. 2006; Felt et al. 2006;
Degelsegger and Torgersen 2011).
The main aim of this paper is to explain this difference as resulting from different
types of policy-making by means of which pTA is approached in the two countries.
The paper will therefore sketch out different practices of policy-making as well as
roles played and self-conceptions adopted by politicians, civil servants, experts and
citizens as expressed therein. It will do this by using the example of xenotrans-
plantation, which is the transplantation of cells, tissues and organs across species. In
the late 1990s, xenotransplantation was perceived as constituting a promising
technology but also as being connected to a number of risks and ethical problems; it
therefore became a matter of regulation. Taking the regulation of xenotransplan-
tation as an example, the paper looks at how policies were developed in Switzerland
and Austria, which actors where involved, and what role pTA played. Since there
was little policy-making in Austria in xenotransplantation, the paper takes a wider
perspective by looking at pTA in Austria more generally and different cases of
policy-making in science and technology policy in the life sciences.
2 Methods
The Swiss case is based on eleven in-depth, face-to-face interviews with experts
from TA-organizations, xenotransplantation research, public administration, politics
and bioethics. The interview partners were either involved in xenotransplantation
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research, TA and pTA on xenotransplantation and/or the respective policy-making
process. The interviews were carried out in 2010. They were taped, fully transcribed
and analysed using ATLAS.ti, a software package for qualitative content analysis.
Data analysis followed Meuser and Nagel’s (2002) suggestions for analysing expert
interviews and focussed entirely on the manifest content.1 Beyond this, the Swiss
case study includes an analysis of material from the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems
and Innovation Research (FhG-ISI), generated during their TA studies on
xenotransplantation in the late 1990s. Moreover, analysis covers documents and
publications provided by TA-Swiss on the TA and pTA on xenotransplantation,
materials produced during the law-making process (e.g. draft bills, reports, records)
and newspaper articles provided either by interview partners or retrieved from the
Internet.
The Austrian case draws on previous research on the regulation of various
innovative areas of biomedicine such as transplantation and xenotransplantation,
human embryonic stem cell research and pre-implantation genetic diagnostics
(Griessler 2010), genetic testing (Griessler and Lehner 2010) and prenatal
diagnostics (Griessler 2012). Also in this case expert, interviews with politicians,
civil servants, experts and other stakeholders were carried out and policy documents
as well as newspaper articles were analysed.
3 Switzerland
3.1 Xenotransplantation policies
The following section provides a short overview on the development of
xenotransplantation policies in Switzerland.
Xenotransplantation became an issue of public debate in Switzerland in the
1990s. However, the debate was neither extensive nor continuous and only of
concern to a small group of informed actors from research, parliament, public
administration and stakeholder organizations. Public interest eventually faded when
xenotransplantation research did not advance as rapidly as predicted.
The debate was controversial and the positions taken on the matter ranged from
clear approval to strict rejection (Bellucci et al. 1998: 157; Hu¨sing et al. 1998: 172
ff.). Supporters argued that xenotransplantation could alleviate organ shortage,
contribute to saving patients’ lives and increase their quality of life. Responding to
animal welfare arguments, they emphasized that each year millions of pigs would be
slaughtered in Switzerland for food anyway (8: 273–287) and that using animals for
medical purposes constituted a far higher goal than eating them (4: 71–81).
Opponents introduced aspects of animal welfare into the debate and voiced
concerns about potential infection risks. They questioned patients’ survival rates,
the quality of life of recipients and raised possible problems related to patient’s
1 In the text, interviews are for the most part paraphrased, sometimes they are also quoted verbatim. In
both cases, the number of the interview and the line numbers of the transcripts are indicated in the text.
Interviews with Swiss interviewees are coded numerically, transcripts with Austrian interviewees
alphanumerically.
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sense of identity and psychological states (2: 155–164, Hu¨sing et al. 1998).
Moreover, they questioned whether it would be ethically acceptable to genetically
modify animals. They argued that xenotransplantation would basically result in
spectacular profits for the pharmaceutical industry.
In 1996, the biotechnology critical NGO Basler Appell gegen Gentechnologie,2
the Swiss Parliament, the Federal Office for Public Health (Bundesamt fu¨r
Gesundheit, FOPH) and TA-Swiss became aware of xenotransplantation (Griessler
2011). This activity was partly triggered by a British market study which forecasted
a huge increase in xenotransplantation in the near future (Laing 1996). Already in
the same year, TA-Swiss commissioned a study on xenotransplantation.
In 1996 and 1997, initiatives to regulate xenotransplantation reached the Swiss
Parliament. In 1999, its two Chambers were divided whether to follow a restrictive
governmental bill and ban the application of xenotransplantation in principle,
allowing only for exceptions. In Parliament, xenotransplantation was primarily
discussed in the context of research and economic policy. Members of Parliament
from a majority of conservative and liberal parties emphasized the importance of the
pharmaceutical industry for Swiss research and Switzerland as a business location.
They opposed a ban or moratorium with the argument that Switzerland could not
stand alone with such a political measure. Highlighting the promises of xenotrans-
plantation, they advocated research into xenotransplantation with prior authoriza-
tion. Finally, the Parliament adopted a permissive law which allowed
xenotransplantation but made it subject to requirements and authorization.
In 2000, this approach was also approved by the majority of lay participants at a
consensus conference type ‘‘PubliForum’’ on transplantation and xenotransplanta-
tion, which TA-Swiss organized in cooperation with the responsible ministry and
the Swiss Academy of Science.
3.2 (Participatory) technology assessment
TA-Swiss, a small TA organization that was still linked to the Swiss Parliament at
the time, perceived xenotransplantation as an up and coming biomedical develop-
ment, the social and ethical impact of which required closer investigation. It
therefore initiated two expert studies (Hu¨sing et al. 1998, 2001) to get an overview
of the field and its implications for Switzerland (Schweizerischer Wissenschaftsrat
1996a, b; Bellucci et al. 1998).
TA-Swiss first contracted a TA study on solid organ xenotransplantation, which
followed a classical TA approach in one sense. The study was to provide an
overview on the international state of the art and its positive and negative
consequences from societal, ethical-anthropological, economic and clinical per-
spectives. It set out to investigate the Swiss situation with regard to acceptance of
xenotransplantation and regulatory questions (Schweizerischer Wissenschaftsrat
1996a). On the other hand, the study involved elements of invited participation
(Hu¨sing et al. 1998: 9 ff.; 231); it included in-depth interviews with Swiss experts
2 I will use in the following a rough English translation of this name, that is, ‘‘Basel Appeal against
Genetic Engineering’’ or short ‘‘Basel Appeal’’.
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and an open and qualitative survey, in which organized stakeholders were asked for
statements on xenotransplantation (Hu¨sing et al. 1998: 232; Bellucci et al. 1998:
157). The study was published in August 1998 and took a cautious approach
towards xenotransplantation. This study was followed by a TA on cellular
xenotransplantation (Hu¨sing et al. 2001).
Based on the Danish consensus conference model, TA-Swiss subsequently
organized a PubliForum on transplantation, which also addressed xenotransplan-
tation (Zentrum fu¨r Technologiefolgen - Abscha¨tzung et al. 2001). The PubliForum
involved 28 citizens who were selected to represent the Swiss population. The
citizens had significant influence on framing the issue under discussion by raising
the questions they wanted to discuss and inviting the experts they wanted to listen
to. Supported by TA-Swiss and a facilitator, participants formulated a report, which
they presented to Members of Parliament, the responsible ministry and The Swiss
Academy of Science. The outcome of the PubliForum was therefore well connected
with established policy-makers. However, it seems the results of the PubiForum
were not disseminated as widely as to reach the general public.
The expert TA and PubliForum were well received by the political system and
xenotransplantation researchers. The TA study was discussed in Parliament and its
quality was recognized in the parliamentary debate. It was extensively referred to in
documents of the responsible ministry and in the message to Parliament. The
opinion of the PubliForum with regard to xenotransplantation was also shared by the
ministry and Parliament.
The PubliForum on transplantation was not the first and last pTA that TA-Swiss
organized. Participatory forms of TA became a standard procedure, which is,
however, not used in all of its studies. Besides traditional expert TA, participatory
instruments used by TA-Swiss also include shorter versions of public participation
such as PubliTalk and PubliFocus.
Swiss xenotransplantation policy cannot be directly linked to the outcome of the
pTA because the main decisions were made before the PubliForum. Moreover, the
majority of the PubliForum supported government policy. The PubliForum
therefore mainly had a legitimizing impact, since the recommendation corresponded
with and supported government policy.
3.3 Policy-making
The following section focuses on central characteristics and institutions of policy-
making in Switzerland and draws on literature about its political system (Linder
1999a, b, 2009; Lu¨thi 1999) and TA in Switzerland (Pfersdorf 2008).
3.3.1 Concordance
Switzerland is the model of consensus democracy, which involves federal structure,
concordance and power sharing. Power sharing is based on federalism, subsidiarity
and voluntary proportional representation in assigning different political offices
with regard to language, party affiliation and gender (Linder 1999a: 467 ff.). The
concordance system developed over decades; this development began in the mid-
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nineteenth century out of a political conflict involving the dominant Liberals and in
which different political movements struggled for political power and were
subsequently included in government (i.e. Catholic-Conservatives in 1891; Farmers-
, Trading- and Citizens-Party after World War I and finally the Social Democrats
only in 1959) (Linder 1999a: 468, b: 14ff).
The concordance system can be explained against the background of direct
democracy, which poses a continuous threat to decisions made in the representative
system and therefore acts as a strong coercion towards concordance. In other words,
to involve the main political actors considerably reduces the risk of government
being defeated by plebiscite.
3.3.2 Federalism
Switzerland is a state with strong federalist elements. The Federation and the 26
cantons have their own constitutions and the around 3,000 communities enjoy large
autonomy. Federalism was important for the maintenance of a peaceful coexistence
of different ethnicities and religious groups. The implementation of the concept of
subsidiarity turns Switzerland into one of the most decentralized countries (Linder
1999a: 457).
3.3.3 Direct democracy
Citizen participation is particularly rich in Switzerland, and direct democracy plays
a central role in the political system. Instruments include (1) obligatory constitu-
tional referendum, (2) facultative referendum on laws, (3) people’s initiative. On
average, the electorate has to vote on six constitutional changes and two to four
referenda on laws annually (Linder 1999a: 462 ff.).
Swiss direct democracy gradually developed out of a nineteenth century
grassroots movement, which distrusted representative democracy and wanted to
limit the power of parliament (Linder 1999a: 463). Though elites play a strong role
in the political system, the electorate can also play an active role by means of direct
democracy. By threatening the political elite with loss of power and reputation,
voters can force a reaction; they therefore constitute a control factor when it comes
to important questions and are significant veto players. The risk that a referendum
might overturn a law is always present; for this reason, ‘‘the entire Swiss political
system is intended to avoid a referendum’’ (9: 300). The Swiss system is also
referred to as a ‘‘half-direct-democracy’’ because of the checks and balances
between government (Federal Council, Bundesrat), Parliament and the electorate. In
other words, these take place between representative democratic and direct
democratic elements, which should enable co-determination of the voters on not
all but the most important matters (Linder 1999a:463).
3.3.4 Government
The Swiss political system is located between a presidential and parliamentary
system. The government consists of seven members. The two chambers of
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Parliament elect one member from the Federal Council as head of state annually
(Federal President, Bundespra¨sident), who only has coordinative functions.
Government plays a strong and independent role vis-a´-vis Parliament. Though
Parliament often asks government to take regulatory steps by means of so-called
Motions, it is the Federal Council that typically prepares laws and plays a main role
in law-making. In reality, the position of the Swiss Government is close to a
presidential system.
Federal Councillors (Bundesra¨te) are elected for four-year terms and cannot be
removed from their posts, whereas re-election is possible. The composition of the
Federal Council acknowledges the country’s multi-ethnicity as well as the strength
of political parties from a long-term perspective. Since 1959, the Federal Council is
composed of representatives of the four major parties. Until 2003, the so-called
magical formula (Zauberformel) stipulated how seats are to be allocated to parties.
The rule of proportional representation of language groups and parties is a major
characteristic of Swiss concordance democracy; it is not laid down in the
constitution but is a tradition followed by political actors voluntarily (Linder 1999a:
459–460). Parties adhere to this very slowly changing distribution of power, which
is not dependent on the latest election results. Since the 2003 elections, which made
the conservative populist SVP the strongest party, the concordance system is under
pressure but is nevertheless still in place after some turbulences with only some
slight modifications (Linder 2009: 571, 573, 597).
3.3.5 Parliament
Though Parliament is the highest political institution, its competences are delimited
by the strong role of government, the strong elements of direct democracy and the
involvement of interest organizations. The Swiss Parliament is a working parliament
but, in comparison with the executive, has a much smaller infrastructure. It has the
right to initiate and pass laws and budget, financial planning as well as to supervise
government and administration. Its two chambers, the National Council (Nation-
alrat, 200 seats) and the Council of States (Sta¨nderat, 46 seats), are equally
important. In order to pass, a bill has to find a majority in both chambers. In cases of
disagreement between the two chambers—which both deal with each bill separately
and in detail—a procedure is launched to settle the difference. If these negotiations
do not succeed, the law fails (Linder 1999a: 461ff.).
Swiss parliamentarians are working in the so-called Milizsystem, that is, they
have a civilian profession and their political mandate is considered an additional
occupation. Members of Parliament are not controlled by party discipline, must not
be given instructions and are only responsible to their conscience. Parties therefore
play a less important role than in many other western democracies.
The Swiss Parliament plays a strong formal role in legislation. It can refuse a
governmental bill without discussing its content and can make detailed changes. By
parliamentary initiatives, it can also make laws without the involvement of
government and administration. It has a question right (Anfrage) and the right to
request a response to a question (Interpellation) from government. Moreover, there
are the instruments of Postulat in which Parliament asks government to examine
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whether it would be possible to draft a law and the Motion, which orders a
governmental bill. Due to the strong role played by the government in the Swiss
political system, the political majority in Parliament is less concerned with retaining
the power of government and can play an independent and strong role as well
(Linder 1999a: 462).
Switzerland features a relatively small bureaucracy (Linder 1999a: 476). Public
administration plays an important role in law-making, since expert knowledge and
experience in the implementation of laws accumulates in the civil service (Linder
1999a: 469). Bills are in most cases prepared by the Federal Council and
administration (94.2 % of all laws between 1991 and 1995, Lu¨thi 1999: 139). The
influence of the parliament on legislation is perceived differently in the literature.
While some authors only attribute a marginal role to the legislature and instead
emphasize the importance of the government and public administration, other
authors call attention to the fact that government drafts are often modified during
parliamentary negotiations (Lu¨thi 1999: 142).
3.3.6 Law-making
Typically government prepares a draft law and sends it into a formal consultation
process (Vernehmlassungsverfahren, see Linder 1999a: 470), in which stakeholders
can express their opinions on a bill and propose changes. The consultation helps to
avoid referenda, which might result in a defeat of government by voters. The call for
a consultation process is published. If the responsible ministry considers opposition
by powerful actors as too strong, it redrafts the governmental bill. After consultation
and amendment, the bill is sent to Parliament as a so-called message (Botschaft).
The message is a comprehensive text, which includes the bill and background
information on the proposal. Only then does Parliament start the process of
discussing and formulating the law within its respective commissions.
3.3.7 Features of the political system
As described, the Swiss political system is characterized by a division and an
interconnection of power between the executive and legislative but also by the
autonomy of cantons, interest groups, parties and single institutions such as the
government. All of these are proportionally represented in decision-making
processes and have veto power. Switzerland is therefore a model case of a
concordance democracy. Advantages of this system include the integration of
interest groups, the protection of minorities and that solutions find broad acceptance.
Disadvantages include lengthy decision-making processes, a strong notion of elite
cooperation and a lack of transparency to outsiders of the system (Pfersdorf 2008).
One of the main features of the Swiss political system is its orientation towards
consensus. The constitution lays down the principle of collegiality in government,
that is, the Federal Council has to find a common policy. The magic formula and the
consultation process also express an orientation towards consensus.
Another characteristic of the Swiss political system identified by an interview
partner is its general pragmatism, in the sense of concentrating on given
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circumstances. This attitude was expressed in the context of xenotransplantation
policies in the sense that animal welfare issues and the infection risk were taken
seriously and were pragmatically integrated into the regulation by stating that
organs had to be tested prior to transplantation. The fundamental question, however,
of whether xenotransplantation should be further pursued at all as a technology, was
hardly debated from this pragmatic perspective (3: 138–177).
3.4 pTA in the context of Swiss policy-making
As previously mentioned, subtlebalances between four language groups, cantonal
and federal competencies and different political parties characterize the Swiss
political system. There are tensions between representative democracy and direct
democracy as well as a strong emphasis on an independent civil society. There is
also a strong notion of compromise in ensuring that a shared community is
sustained. Compromises are facilitated by a political discourse with a particular
notion of matter-of-factness,pragmatism and, at least in the context of xenotrans-
plantation, avoidance of radical stances.
Taking into account the main characteristics of Swiss policy-making, pTA is
therefore well suited and serves several of its previously mentioned basic needs, that
is, a need for matter-of-fact and sober discussion by ordinary, independent citizens
so as to inform policy-makers, who in a fragile and polycentric political system are
constantly threatened by popular veto. In the opinion of one researcher, pTA suits
direct democracy since it provides new information, discussion and, in contrast to
newspapers, does not remain on a polemic level (8: 375–389). In this sense, a pTA
such as the PubliForum can be interpreted as yet another mechanism within Swiss
concordance democracy (9: 348–351).
Interviews showed that pTA, such as a PubliForum, is particularly well suited to
and complements existing channels, through which the Swiss electorate participates
in legislation and political decision making; a consultation is only carried out in the
context of legislation. Moreover, in reality, the consultation mechanism is geared
towards involving organized political actors. The right to initiative is a way for
citizens to become active but is always geared towards constitutional changes. A
referendum always occurs post-festum, when a law has been passed and the
electorate can vote on it. In contrast, the PubliForum provides a means for the
executive to actively approach a group of citizens, composed as much as possible of
representatives of the population, and to invite them to voice their opinion on a
topic. Since it is open to regular citizens, it is a much more informal and low-
threshold approach than a consultation because ordinary citizens are often not
conscious of their right to voice their opinion in a consultation. This consultative
instrument is mostly used by established political organizations and authorities. On
the other hand, it seems that the pTA is more directed at policy-makers than the
general public, since it was noticed more by policy-makers than by the media and
was relatively well integrated into the political decision-making processes.
However, it should be kept in mind that neither TA nor pTA is uncontested in the
Swiss political system (4: 327–344, Crettaz von Roten 2011: 18). pTA had to face
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criticism from political parties advocating a lean state and glorifying the role of
individual citizens and the electorate.
4 Austria
4.1 Xenotransplantation policies
While policy-makers in other countries and international organizations discussed
xenotransplantation policies at the turn of the millennium, Austrian policy-makers
decided not to take regulatory measures at the time and in 2004 transposed the
relevant European Directive (2001/20/EC) into national legislation without there
being much public discussion. This decision for regulatory inactivity around the turn
of the millennium was not caused by a lack of information. Austrian civil servants
were well informed about xenotransplantation, and some of them were rather
sceptical because of the infection risk (Griessler and Littig 2006). They frequently
participated in international conferences and workshops that dealt with regulatory
problems of xenotransplantation. However, this involvement did not result in any
broader debate on xenotransplantation policies because civil servants thought it
would be pointless to start a discussion over a technology, which might perhaps
become a reality in 10–20 years (D: 370–372). This matches a well-known strategy
in Austrian policy-making, that is, postponing decisions in order to avoid debates
(Griessler 2010: 165). The topic of xenotransplantation never left the realm of
ministries and neither Parliament nor the broader public discussed the issue in any
detail. Also, the scientific advisory system was almost entirely absent in Austrian
xenotransplantation policies.
4.2 Participatory technology assessment
Austrian policy-makers regularly emphasize public involvement and dialogue when
they address problems of new technologies (Kronberger and Kerbe 2010: 19).
Statements of the Austrian Council for Research and Technology Development (Rat
fu¨r Forschung und Technologieentwicklung, in the following RFT; RFT 2003,
2009) exemplify this participatory language. However, even the RFT recognizes a
discrepancy between rhetoric and reality and concludes that ‘‘selling science’’ is
clearly dominant in Austrian science communication (RFT 2009: 29).
This raises the question to what extent the public is actually involved in Austrian
science and technology policy and what the chances of pTA are. In this context,
Degelsegger and Torgersen (2011) emphasize the significance of ‘‘deeply held
beliefs and engrained practices of political decision-making’’ (391). Drawing on
political practices in the regulation of various innovative areas of biomedicine, such
as transplantation, xenotransplantation, human embryonic stem cell research, pre-
implantation genetic diagnostics (PGD) (Griessler 2010), genetic testing (Griessler
and Lehner 2010) and prenatal diagnostics (PND, Griessler 2012), it will be argued
that pTA faces serious difficulties in Austria because of dominant political practices
and assumptions about policy-making and the public.
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Formalized procedures of citizen involvement in priority setting in science and
technology policy and technology assessment are non-existent in Austria (Kron-
berger and Kerbe 2010: 17ff.). pTA was only adopted in the mid-1990s, and
researchers agree that pTA exercises remained infrequent (Grabner et al. 2002;
Bogner 2004; Nentwich et al. 2006; Felt et al. 2006; Degelsegger and Torgersen
2011). pTA processes were methodologically diverse and included mediation
processes (Grabner et al. 2002), consensus conferences (Bogner 2004; Grabner et al.
2002: 61 ff., Felt et al. 2006: 116 ff.), stakeholder dialogues (Griessler and Littig
2006) and public discussions (Felt et al. 2003: 118 ff.). Issues discussed were, for
example, traffic, picking research areas for public funding, ground level ozone,
xenotransplantation and genetic testing. Evaluations of the success of Austrian pTA
processes were diverse, and judgments range from regarding them as a failure to
being partially successful. The problems encountered are similar to other countries
and include inadequate financing and lack of time; problems in recruiting
participants; unfavourable group dynamics in the lay panel; communication
difficulties between experts and laypeople; insufficient connection to the general
public and to political decision making (Joss and Torgersen 2002: 176; Felt et al.
2006). As Bogner (2010) puts it, pTA exercises in Austria remained ‘‘laboratory
experiments’’, insofar as they had no impact on political decision making
whatsoever and were actually cases of top-down and invited participation,
organized as methodological experiments by social scientists with no impact on
political decision making whatsoever (Kronberger and Kerbe 2010: 17).
The following section analyses some of the reasons for this limited use of
participatory exercises in science and technology policy.
4.3 Policy-making
There is little discussion in the Austrian Parliament about science and technology.
Topics such as human embryonic stem cell research (Griessler 2010), PGD
(Griessler and Lehner 2010), genetic testing (Griessler and Pichelstorfer 2010) and
xenotransplantation (Griessler and Littig 2006), which have been debated in
Parliament in many other countries, were hardly discussed in Austria’s National
Council. Though relevant laws obviously have to pass the Parliament for
constitutional reasons, the involvement of Parliament in actual decision making is
often limited. Like many parliamentary systems (Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Mene´ndez
2004: 113) and despite the theory of separation of power, laws in Austria are not
prepared by the legislative. Instead law-making is concentrated in the executive
branch, more precisely in the ministerial bureaucracy, where federal laws are
typically prepared by the civil service (Ta`los and Kittel 2001) and enter Parliament
as governmental bills (Regierungsvorlage; Pelinka 2008).
4.3.1 Civil servants
Civil servants prepare governmental bills either on assignment by their political
superiors or on their own initiative (Griessler and Lehner 2010). They start their
work with a first draft, which is negotiated in a number of phases involving a
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number of actors. During the first informal pre-consultation phase (Vorbegutach-
tungsverfahren), the actors include civil servants from their own ministry and other
ministries as well as important political actors who might be affected by the law,
such as politically powerful special interest groups.
After civil servants consult political superiors in their ministry and amend the
draft accordingly, the draft bill enters the official consultation phase (Begutach-
tungsverfahren), in which other ministries, provincial governments, social partners
and other potentially affected organized interest groups, and sometimes—because of
particular expertise—individuals, are officially invited to comment on the draft bill.
Civil servants then collect and analyse these comments. The draft bill is changed—
often only marginally, but sometimes even substantially—before it enters the
Council of Ministers. It has to be unanimously approved there to become a
governmental bill, which is then sent to Parliament. During the ensuing
parliamentary process, it is the central goal of the ministry in charge to get the
law through Parliament ‘‘undamaged’’ (Griessler and Lehner 2010: 130).
Several political practices of civil servants can be identified during the
aforementioned law-making process (Biegelbauer and Griessler 2009: 67ff.). This
paper focuses on the regulation of access, which refers to the inclusion and
exclusion of actors. The involvement of actors typically occurs in a concentric
movement, where the responsible ministry is at the centre and moving outwards,
others are included over time (Biegelbauer and Griessler 2009; Griessler and Lehner
2010).
The most important phases of the Austrian law-making process are informal.
Civil servants collect first comments within their own ministry; then they include
other ministries. Thereafter, organizations of interest, most importantly the social
partners, are involved although this often occurs with considerable delay. Then, if at
all, political parties and less important organizations of interest are asked to
comment. In this phase, it is important to mitigate as many potential conflicts of
interest as possible. As a matter of routine, civil servants try to exclude the broader
public from this pre-consultation phase. This enables privileged actors to
communicate and to bargain without losing face. Since Austria is a small country,
the fact that there are only a small number of actors, who also tend to know each
other, facilitates informality. The result of the informal negotiation process, the
ministerial draft, is published and sent out for official comments in the formal
consultation phase.
In Austria, civil servants play a much more significant role in law-making than is
commonly perceived by social scientists and the broader public. They are not
merely subordinates executing orders but are instead influential actors and gate-
keepers, who organize, facilitate, negotiate, record and partly co-determine the law-
making process. They provide technical expertise and are responsible for details, for
example, to negotiate or to formulate a law. They often make preliminary decisions
that have to be approved by their political superiors. Ministers, on the other hand,
reserve their right to make a decision on a regulation at any time during the
decision-making process and enjoy a considerable freedom from the obligation to
follow a fixed procedure. The contribution of civil servants to law-making is not
restricted to the pre-parliamentarian realm but extends into parliament, for example,
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into meetings of parliamentary factions or in committee work, where they explain
the governmental bill to Members of Parliament. For cases, in which changes of
governmental bills are required in the National Council, civil servants make the
necessary amendments literally ‘‘until the last minute, often even in Parliament’’
(Griessler and Lehner 2010: 125).
4.4 Neo-corporatism
Austrian policy-making is strongly influenced by neo-corporatism (Pelinka 2008;
Ta`los and Kittel 2001), which in the context of law-making refers to the
participation of well-organized and well-established interest groups in the pre-
consultation and consultation phases. The most important actors are the so-called
social partners, a small and closed circle of organizations representing employers
and employees. Glynn et al. draw the image of an exclusive club that ‘‘is small, the
barriers to entry are high and the turnover of leading policy-makers low’’ (2003:
28). Austrian science and technology policy is also characterized by neo-
corporatism. Decisions are typically made by a rather small number of actors from
politics, civil service, science and interest organizations (Griessler 2010: 176).
The other side of the coin of neo-corporatism is the limited direct role of the
public in policy-making. Austrian civil society is weak and, with the exception of
general elections and a few possibilities of direct democracy, citizens are not
directly included in policy-making, but only indirectly and pro forma by ‘‘obligatory
membership in chambers of commerce, labor and agriculture’’ (Glynn et al. 2003:
29). In recent years, changes towards a strengthening of civil society have happened
although they are progressing rather slowly.
Austrian neo-corporatism has to be understood against the background of a long
history of a paternalistic relationship between the state and the public, which is
condensed in the term ‘‘enlightened absolutism’’ (Aufgekla¨rter Absolutismus); this
refers to a central and formative period of Austrian state, bureaucracy and policy-
making in the eighteenth century (Hanisch 2005: 26). Degelsegger and Torgersen
describe the tradition of enlightened absolutism, which still exists in Austria today,
as benevolently enlightened but basically autocratic. It entails that ‘‘policy-makers
aim to inform a public supposedly unaware of its own best interests, while they fear
obstructive mobilization against their own, in their view, essential function to drive
forward objectively necessary, sensible and useful policy projects, balancing
powerful interests’’ (2011: 392).
4.5 Expert orientation
While scientific advice is hardly institutionalized in Austria and mostly occurs ‘‘on
an irregular and informal basis’’ (Kronberger and Kerbe 2010: 21), scientists do
have an important influence on Austrian politics. However, the direction and extent
of this influence are not always clear and foreseeable. Therefore, ‘‘it is hard to
predict when scientific advice will be followed and when it will not’’ (ibid.: 22). In
the area of biomedicine, scientific experts, particularly physicians, have a dominant
power of definition (Griessler 2010). Experts and their established, self-confident
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and powerful interest lobbying organizations are successfully integrated into
Austrian policy-making. In biomedicine and bioethics, a small number of scientific
experts and physicians play an important role in committees and advisory boards,
such as the Austrian Bioethics Commission, the National Health Council, the Gene
Technology Commission and its sub-committees.
4.6 Closeness
In Austria, political practices of law-making are typically elitist and remain behind
closed doors. Central processes such as those of the pre-consultation and the
consultation phases, as well as parliamentary committee meetings, exclude the
public. The plenary session in Parliament, in which the law is put to a vote, is
typically the very first debate the public has access to. This session, however, is
strongly ritualistic and tends to be a theatrical performance; it is staged for an
imagined audience of voters that merely exists in front of a television set. In
addition, no decisions are actually made during this debate, apart from a formal
acceptance of what was already decided on a long time ago in the pre-
parliamentarian phase by powerful actors who are not necessarily present in
parliament.
4.7 Taboo
The tendency to avoid and regard political conflict as taboo is an important aspect of
Austrian policy-making. Observing taboos avoids entering into strong and
seemingly intractable conflicts. The most important taboos in Austrian science
and technology policy concern nuclear energy, GMO and—in the area of bio-, and
reproductive medicine—the regulation of abortion.
The conflict over the criminal liability of abortion is still influential in Austrian
life, science and policies; it continues to affect areas such as human embryonic stem
cell research, PND, PGD and in vitro fertilization. It seemingly ended in 1975 with a
fragile but lasting compromise that combines permissive legal regulation with partly
restrictive implementation (Griessler 2007). The lesson that most policy-makers
learned from this conflict was to avoid debates that might disturb this fragile cease-
fire (Griessler 2010).
A second major taboo in Austrian science and technology policy is nuclear
energy. This conflict ended in 1978 with the decision to terminate the operation of a
completed power plant, after the electorate opposed nuclear energy in a popular
vote.
A third taboo concerns GMOs, particularly in agriculture. In 1998, the Austrian
Government faced a public initiative on gene technology (Gentechnikvolksbegeh-
ren), which was extremely critical of GMOs. It demanded restrictive governmental
policies and became one of the most successful public initiatives in Austrian history.
This success shocked Austrian policy-makers who perceived biotechnology as a
means for economic growth. Ever since, policy-makers have aimed to avoid a repeat
of the political disaster they stumbled into in the late 1990s.
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These conflicts constitute pivotal events in the elite perception of the public in
questions of science and technology. All of them were extremely emotional,
characterized by seemingly irreconcilable cleavages within society and followed by
a political deadlock. They were rare cases in which strong public mobilization
challenged the normal method of top-down policy-making, which can be
characterized as a ‘‘hierarchical techno-political system’’ (Kronberger/Kerbe: 19).
4.8 Public
4.8.1 Policy-makers’ perception of pTA
According to Degelsegger/Torgersen, Austrian policy-makers have a rather hesitant
and ambivalent relationship towards pTA; having been confronted with a public that
strongly opposed new technologies in the past, they perceive a ‘‘tension between the
fear of a mobilized public and the need to seek public support’’ (2011: 396). Policy-
makers see a dilemma between the need for public backing and their intention to
keep the public away from political discussion and decision making because it could
obstruct the introduction of new technologies. There is a fear that pTA might
strengthen negative mobilization against technologies (ibid. 396). For these reasons,
Austrian policy-makers avoid giving pTA a role to ‘‘encourage discussion‘‘(Kron-
berger and Kerbe 2010: 19), to further participation in policy-making and to
increase democratic legitimacy by furthering the ‘‘inclusion of alternative rational-
ities’’ (Degelsegger and Torgersen 2011: 398). In contrast, they perceive pTA as a
means ‘‘to inform and convince’’ the public (Degelsegger and Torgersen 2011: 398).
4.8.2 Self-perception of policy-makers and their perception of the public
Austrian policy-makers, experts and representatives of interest groups perceive the
public in pronouncedly paternalistic terms (Degelsegger and Torgersen 2011). This
is expressed in various ways; firstly, in that they regard themselves as being able to
find optimal solutions that they then want to be implemented ‘‘with the least
possible opposition’’ (ibid. 400). From this perspective, ‘‘it appears impossible (…)
that the combined wisdom of the policy, technical and financial experts and the
balance of powerful interests could be trumped by lay insights’’ (ibid.). Secondly,
they perceive the public as being ‘‘ignorant’’ (ibid.). Policy-makers believe to
‘‘know what the public ‘really’ wants’’ (ibid. 398) and that they have to act on
behalf of the public. Participation, in this line of argument, is intrinsically pointless.
In line with this, the relationship between science and the public is characterized by
a deficit model, which assumes that the public requires information and education
(Aufkla¨rungsdiskurs, Felt et al. 2006: 104).
4.9 pTA in the context of Austrian policy-making
In contrast to democracy theory and the widespread public image, the Austrian
Parliament—like in many western democracies—actually has a less strong position
in law-making than government. This is caused by a lack of financial resources,
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personnel and expertise. Parliament is less a place of decision making, than an
obligatory passage point. Draft bills typically enter Parliament as governmental bills
and often leave it almost unchanged.
Since the executive branch has a particularly strong role in law-making, it is
necessary to look closely at connected processes and actors. Ministers (and their
staff) want to retain the space for political manoeuvre and reserve the power to
make political decisions at any time of the political process. Civil servants play a
particularly important role in law-making because of their technical expertise; they
organize the process and put the law down in writing. Their influence is not limited
to the pre-parliamentarian phase, but extends into Parliament. Social partners and
political actors of organized interests are also important groups of actors. Within the
law-making process, the pre-parliamentarian phase is of utmost importance. It is
characterized by neo-corporatism, expert orientation, informality and deliberate
exclusion of un-invited actors and the public.
The strong notion of neo-corporatism is also important in science and technology
policy. The paternalistic tendency of this policy approach is deeply rooted in
Austrian history, for example, in Counter Reformation and in eighteenth century
enlightened absolutism. In this tradition, a dominant paternalist elite of policy-
makers and experts is sceptical of the public’s ability to form its own sensible
political opinion. Nevertheless, public support is considered indispensable to
advancing technologies, which are in turn indispensable from the elite’s perspective
(Degelsegger and Torgersen 2011).
Issues of science and technology policy are not frequently publicly debated in
Austria because of a strong notion of taboo when it comes to controversies and a
tendency to procrastinate when it comes to making decisions in divisive areas. Past
conflicts over nuclear power, GMOs and abortion cast a cloud over current
discussions of science and technology policy (Griessler 2010).
Due to these characteristics of Austrian policy-making, the chances of pTA as a
means to actively involve the public in policy-making have to be assessed rather
sceptically. In many ways, pTA virtually contradicts central practices and
assumptions of Austrian policy-making. So far, pTA has been used in Austria
often as ‘‘laboratory experiments’’ by social scientists (Bogner 2010) and is
perceived by policy-makers a marketing tool rather than as an instrument to
promote public participation.
5 Conclusion
The comparison of Switzerland and Austria demonstrates different approaches to
xenotransplantation policy-making as well as different applications of pTA.
Switzerland proactively and independently developed its own xenotransplanta-
tion policies. It witnessed a small, but informed public debate and a thorough
discussion in Parliament. The policy-making process involved many political actors,
ministries, parliament, experts, NGOs and was, among other information, also based
on TA and pTA. Austria, in contrast, adopted a wait-and-see position and only years
later followed European legislation. There was no public debate, discussion in
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Parliament or expert bodies. The executive, namely civil servants, dealt with the
topic and kept it within their realm.
Experiences with pTA were also fundamentally different between Switzerland
and Austria. pTA seems to fit the Swiss way of policy-making much better than the
Austrian. Despite the similarities between the two small western democracies and
although both countries are concordance democracies, there are remarkable
differences between the two that distinguish them in terms of being prepared for
participatory exercises. Whereas Swiss concordance democracy emphasizes
pluralism and a higher distribution of power between a larger number of actors,
Austrian concordance democracy is characterized by a dominance of a small
number of organized actors which try to pervade society and involve citizens by
means of mandatory membership. The most striking and important difference
between Switzerland and Austria, however, is the veto power of its citizenry, which
is particularly strong in Switzerland but remarkably weak in Austria. In the Swiss
context, pTA seems functional to avoid potential resistance from the public. Unlike
Austria, there is an emphasis in Swiss policy-making on including minorities.
Moreover, there is an emphasis on rationality and matter-of-factness in public
discourse, which is contrasted in Austria by a strong role of taboo that is meant to
avoid the controversial and emotional debates experienced in the past. There are
also differences between the two countries regarding the dominant formative group
of society. Whereas in Switzerland the idea of an independent citizenry in policy-
making is a powerful image of self-perception, in Austria it is state bureaucracy
with its roots in enlightened absolutism, in which citizens are perceived as subjects
to be guided.
The two cases of Switzerland and Austria strongly indicate that pTA can only be
transferred across countries skilfully and with great caution. pTA has not only to fit
into long-standing practices of policy-making but also accord to the self-perception
and roles of important actors such as politicians, civil servants, experts, stakehold-
ers, NGOs and the public. This does not at all mean that change towards more
participation in science and technology policy is impossible, but that it needs
realism, persistence and time.
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